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Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States:
Will the Love Boat Finally Sink the
Harbor Maintenance Tax?
Sara Lundell
The Harbor Maintenance TaxI has been a thorn in the sides
of importers and exporters since its enactment in 1986.2 It has
harmed U.S. ports, effectively diverting trade to Canadian
ports.3 Moreover, the tax violates the United States Constitu-
tion when applied to exports 4 and may violate the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) when applied to
imports.5 Yet the money generated by the tax is necessary for
the continued maintenance and improvement of United States
ports.6 The United States Congress should thus abolish the
Harbor Maintenance Tax and replace it with an acceptable
source of funding.
1. See infra Part I-A.
2. See Nicholas Roegner, Supremes Sink HMT, 12 EXPORT PRAC., May 15,
1998, available in 1998 WL 10115964.
3. See Howard Schragin, U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States: A Victory for
U.S.-Canada Maritime Trade, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1764, 1804 (1996) (dis-
cussing the difference in tax liability a shipper faces at U.S. ports-approxi-
mately US$75,000-in comparison to Canadian ports-approximately US$432-
US$8640).
4. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1296
(1998).
5. See Request for Consultations by the European Communities: United
States-Harbour Maintenance Tax, Feb. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 61306
(W.T.O.) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by the European Commission];
Request for Consultations: Communication From Canada: United States-
Harbour Maintenance Tax, Mar. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 92144 (W.T.O.)
[hereinafter Request for Consultations by Canada]; Request for Consultations:
Communication From Japan: United States-Harbour Maintenance Tax, Mar.
3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 92142 (W.T.O.) [hereinafter Request for Consul-
tations by Japan]; Request for Consultations: Communication From Norway:
United States-Harbour Maintenance Tax, Mar. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL
96663 (W.T.O.) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by Norway].
6. See Tom Ichniowski & Debra Rubin, Administration Studies Options
After Court Nixes Harbor Tax, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Apr. 13, 1998, at 12
(noting the President of the American Association of Port Authorities' state-
ment that Congress must act quickly to prevent critical dredging delays).
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This Comment argues that the recently decided Princess
Cruises, Inc. v. United States should be upheld by the Federal
Circuit on review. Princess Cruises holds that the Harbor Main-
tenance Tax, as applied to cruise ship passengers, is an uncon-
stitutional tax on exports. By affirming the lower court's
decision, the Federal Circuit will hasten the death of this uncon-
stitutional tax and force Congress to replace it with a source of
funding that complies with both the Constitution and GATT.'
Part I provides background information about the Harbor
Maintenance Tax and examines it in light of the Constitution
and GATT. Part II analyzes the Court of International Trade's
(CIT) decision in Princess Cruises. Part III analyzes the Harbor
Maintenance Tax in light of the United States' obligations under
GATT. Part IV sets out a proposal for Congress to achieve its
goal of an improved navigation system without violating either
the Constitution or GATT.
I. BACKGROUND TO PRINCESS CRUISES, INC. v.
UNITED STATES
A. THE HARBOR MAINTENANCE TAX
Congress enacted the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) as
part of the Comprehensive Water Resources Development Act of
1986.8 The Act was designed to improve and maintain the
nation's navigable water system by raising funds for required
capital expenditures through increased taxes on fuel and a new
tax on harbors.9 Prior to the Act, the costs for such expend-
7. See Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 15 F.Supp.2d. 801, 805 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1998).
8. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100
Stat. 4082. See also the following Public Laws enacted by the 105 t' Congress,
which in aggregate appropriate $3.2 billion from the Harbor Maintenance Trust
Fund to pay for general construction, operation, maintenance, emergency re-
pairs and administrative expenses related to the Harbor Maintenance Tax: En-
ergy and Water Resources Development and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
105-62, 111 Stat. 1320, 1325 (1997); Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681
(1999); Act of May 1, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-174, 112 Stat. 58, 71; Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-245, 112 Stat. 1838,
1839 (1998); Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-61, 111 Stat. 1272, 1279 (1997).
9. See S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6639, 6644; H.R. Rep. No. 99-228, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
6705, 6709. The Senate report describes the sorry state of the nation's locks
and dams-ninety-seven of the 240 existing locks are at least fifty years old-
and predicts that capital expenditures of between $5.2 billion and $12 billion
will be required to rehabilitate them by the year 2003. S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 7-
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itures were paid from the general funds of the U.S Treas-
ury.10
The statute imposes the HMT on "any port use," which it
defines as "the loading of commercial cargo on, or the unloading
of commercial cargo from, a commercial vessel at a port."'" The
tax is levied on an ad valorem basis, originally set at 0.04 per-
cent 12 and currently set at 0.125 percent of the value of the com-
mercial cargo being loaded or unloaded in United States ports. ' 3
Collected when the cargo is loaded or unloaded, 14 the money
from the tax is placed in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
and used to pay for all expenses incurred by the Department of
Treasury, Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of
Commerce in administering the HMT, "but not in excess of
$5,000,000 for any fiscal year."15 This cap on spending has re-
sulted in a current surplus estimated at over $1 billion in the
Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. 16
B. THE HMT AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The United States Shoe Corporation, along with approxi-
mately 4000 U.S. exporters, 17 challenged the HMT as a violation
of the Export Clause of the Constitution.' 8 The Export Clause
8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6644-45. Despite the apparently dire situ-
ation facing the inland waterway system, the report lists the "single most sig-
nificant feature" of the bill as its modern harbor development policy. S. Rep.
No. 99-126, at 7-8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6645.
10. See Stephen J. Thompson, Port Maintenance and Improvements, and
Federal User Fees: Overview and Selected Policy Options, CRS Rep. for Con-
gress 1, 1 (last updated Sept. 24, 1998).
11. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(a) (1996).
12. See S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6646;
H.R. Rep. No. 99-228, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6709-10.
13. See 26 U.S.C. § 4461(b).
14. See id. § 4461(c)(2). Accord H.R. Rep. 99-228, at 6, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6709-10; S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 9, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6646-47 (stating "[tihe fees will be collected on all cargos loaded
and unloaded at America's commercial harbors, including those in the Great
Lakes.").
15. 26 U.S.C. § 9505(c)(3) (1996).
16. See Schragin, supra note 3, at 1803. See also infra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
17. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1293 n.2
(1998) (noting that 4000 cases raising this claim were stayed in the Court of
International Trade (CIT) at the time it decided the case). See also Tracy Hol-
lingsworth, Refunds for Harbor Maintenance Taxes, 185 J. ACCT. 6, 63 (1998);
Supreme Court Reviews Case Against Federal Cargo Taxes, LRP Publications
Eurowatch, Nov. 28, 1997 (both noting an excess of 4000 cases in the pipeline
regarding the HMT).
18. See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1293.
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states: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State."19 The CIT and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit both held that the HMT, as applied to exports, is an un-
constitutional tax.
In United States v. United States Shoe Corporation, a unani-
mous Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Cir-
cuit. 20 In reaching its conclusion, the Court looked to its most
recent decision involving the Export Clause: United States v. In-
ternational Business Machines Corp. (IBM).21 IBM held that
the Export Clause "categorically bars Congress from imposing
any tax on exports."22 The Court, however, noted that the Ex-
port Clause does not bar legitimate user fees, which are fees that
lack the attributes of a generally applicable tax or duty and are
"designed as compensation for government-supplied services, fa-
cilities, or benefits." 23
To determine whether the HMT was such a fee, the court
applied the test it developed in Pace v. Burgess.24 In Pace, the
challenged provision was an exception to the federal excise tax
on tobacco. 25 Congress provided that the tax would not apply to
tobacco destined for export. To prevent fraud, Congress re-
quired all export-bound tobacco to bear a stamp indicating that
intention. 26 The stamps cost twenty-five cents per package, but
there was no limit on "the quantity or value of the tobacco pack-
19. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
20. 118 S.Ct. at 1295.
21. See id. at 1292 (citing United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S.
843 (1996)).
22. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1296. See also IBM, 517 U.S. at
846 (extending Export Clause protection from federal taxation "not only [to]
export goods, but also services and activities closely related to the export
process.").
23. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1292. Accord Pace v. Burgess,
92 U.S. 372, 375-76 (1876).
24. See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. at 1292 (citing Pace, 92 U.S. at
372-76). Although the Court separates the test into these two distinct charac-
teristics in United States Shoe Corp., in the Pace opinion this separation is far
less clear. In Pace, the court seems to decide the issue on the nature and pur-
pose of the fee and merely adds in closing that the constitutional fee is also not
excessive. See Pace, 92 U.S. at 376. This is more logical than separating the
test of whether a fee is merely compensation for services rendered into two
parts, since if the fee does only cover costs, than by definition it is not excessive.
The only way a fee could pass the first part of the test, yet fail the second is if
the costs themselves are excessive. Based on the current surplus in the Harbor
Maintenance Trust Fund, perhaps the Court is suggesting that they are.
25. See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1295.
26. See id.
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aged for export or the size of the stamped package."27 When the
stamp program was challenged under the Export Clause, the
Court concluded that the cost of the stamp program was not a
tax on exports, but rather "compensation given for services [in
fact] rendered."28 The Court relied on two factors to arrive at
this decision. First, the stamps "bore no proportion whatever to
the quantity or value of the package"29 on which they were af-
fixed. Second, the fee was not excessive. 30
Applying the Pace test to the HMT on exports, the Court
found that the HMT failed the first prong. 31 The HMT is applied
on an ad valorem basis, set at 0.125% of the value of the cargo
intended for export.32 But, as the Court pointed out, the value of
export cargo bears little relation to the amount of government
services a vessel carrying such cargo actually uses.33 The Court
agreed with the Federal Circuit that, in order to assess a vessel's
port use, the HMT would have to reflect such relevant factors as
"size and tonnage of a vessel, the length of time it spends in port,
and the services it requires."34 The Court affirmed the Federal
Circuit's judgment that the HMT, as applied to exports, cannot
be justified as a legitimate user fee and is instead an unconstitu-
tional tax.35
The Court did not find it necessary to address the second
prong of the Pace test, whether the fee imposed was excessive.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Court implies that of the three types of tariffs-ad valorem,
specific and mixed-an ad valorem tax could never qualify as a legitimate user
fee. See id. An ad valorem tax is set as a certain percentage of the value of the
goods taxed. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND IN-
TERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 373-74 (3d
ed. 1995). A specific tax is a flat charge per unit or quantity of goods, such as
the stamp cost imposed on each package of tobacco in Pace. See id. Finally, a
mixed tax is some combination of the ad valorem and specific taxes. See id.
30. See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1295.
31. See id. at 1292. United States Shoe Corporation had paid the HMT on
articles it exported during the period of April-June 1994 and then filed a protest
with the Customs Service alleging that the HMT is an unconstitutional tax on
exports. See id. at 1291. When the Customs Service answered with a letter
stating that the HMT is not an unconstitutional tax on exports, but rather a fee
imposed on port users, United States Shoe brought an action in the CIT seeking
a refund of the taxes it had paid under what it considered a constitutionally
prohibited tax on exports. See id.
32. See 26 U.S.C. § 4461(b) (1996).
33. See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1295.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1296.
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However, it would most likely have found the fee excessive. 36
The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund has accumulated a large
surplus, currently estimated to be from $650 million 37 to over $1
billion.38 This surplus provides substantive evidence that the
HMT is excessive and does not reasonably correlate with the
cost of services actually used by those who are subject to the
tax.3 9 It is hard to see how the HMT would qualify as a legiti-
36. The current surplus in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund shows that
the fee is much greater than necessary to pay for harbor maintenance costs.
See Supreme Court Reviews Case Against Federal Cargo Taxes, supra note 17.
37. See Schragin, supra note 3, at 1803. See also Supreme Court Reviews
Case Against Federal Cargo Taxes, supra note 17 (stating that the surplus is
expected to rise to $3 billion by 2001); Roegner, supra note 2 (stating that the
Harbor Maintenance Fund currently has more than $12.4 billion awaiting
distribution).
38. See Hearings before the Water Resources and Env't Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Trans. and Infrastructure, 105th Cong., (1998) (statement of
Harry N. Cook, President of the National Waterways Conference, Inc.), avail-
able in 1998 WL 11515806.
39. According to the petitioner, the Supreme Court seems to have followed
the lead of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in ignoring the issue of
whether the HMT is excessive and determining the tax's constitutionality on
the apparent relation between the cost imposed and the service provided. See
Brief for Petitioner at *19, United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct.
1290 (1998) (No. 97-372), available in 1997 WL 772730 [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner]. However, both parties addressed the issue in their briefs. See id;
Brief for Respondent at *6, No. 97-372, United States v. United States Shoe
Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290 (1998) (No. 97-372), available in 1998 WL 19842 [herein-
after Brief for Respondant]. The Petitioner emphasizes that the size of the sur-
plus in the Trust Fund is irrelevant because the surplus is not paid into the
general revenues of the United States Treasury. See Brief for Petitioner at *18,
n.8. Petitioner relies on the fact that the money in the Trust Fund cannot be
used for anything other than operation and maintenance of harbor facilities and
on the fact that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit never concluded
that the HMT is excessive to support its position that the fees collected under
the HMT are not excessive. See id. at *20, n.10. Respondent relies on the CIT's
finding that the HMT is excessive because it is used to fund future projects
rather than to repay the government for services rendered and because it pro-
duces an ever expanding surplus. See Brief for Respondent at *6. Respondent
also argues that surplus is relevant to the question of excessiveness because it
shows that the revenues provided by the HMT are clearly in excess of the fed-
eral costs of harbor maintenance and there is no evidence which suggests that
the surplus is a merely temporary occurrence explainable by the year-to-year
fluctuations in need, as the Government contends it is. See id. at *42. It is
important to note that both Petitioner and Respondent addressed the issue of
excessiveness under the three-prong test set forth in Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) and Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972). However, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly stated in United States Shoe Corp. that "[t]hose decisions involved con-
stitutional provisions other than the Export Clause, however, and thus do not
govern here." United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1295
(1998).
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mate user fee because it is both unrelated to the services ren-
dered and excessive.
C. THE HMT AND GATT
On February 6, 1998, seven weeks before the Supreme
Court declared the HMT an unconstitutional tax on exports40
and months before the CIT extended that ruling to taxes im-
posed on cruise ship passengers 41, the European Communities
submitted a Request for Consultations to the United States and
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to challenge the imposition of the HMT on imports.42
Canada, Japan, and Norway later joined the European Commu-
nities in this request.43 The Request for Consultations alleges
that the HMT constitutes an infringement of Articles I, II, III,
VIII and X of GATT, as well as the WTO Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of GATT. The arguments sup-
porting the complaining parties' position on each of the chal-
lenged provisions are described in Part III, infra.
II. PRINCESS CRUISES, INC. v. UNITED STATES
In Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, the Princess
Cruise Line challenged the imposition of the HMT on its passen-
gers as an unconstitutional tax on exports. 44 The CIT agreed,
relying on its own reasoning in United States Shoe Corpora-
tion.45 The court found that the definition of commercial cargo
40. See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1292.
41. See Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 15 F.Supp.2d 801, 805 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1998).
42. See Request for Consultations by the European Commission, supra
note 5. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1998 REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRI-
ERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 16 (1998) (describing the European Communi-
ties' objections to the HMT).
43. See Request for Consultations by Canada, supra note 5; Request for
Consultations by Japan, supra note 5; Request for Consultations by Norway,
supra note 5.
44. 15 F.Supp.2d 801 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998). The case arose from an audit
conducted by the Customs' Regulatory Audit Division which suggested that
Princess had under payed Arriving Passenger Fees and HMT fees for the period
spanning 1986-1991. See id. at 802. Customs then issued two bills to Princess
for the underpayment of fees. See id. In response, Princess filed a protest and a
lawsuit. See id. Pursuant to the Customs regulations, the tax was based on the
ticket price paid by the cruise ship passengers "or on the prevailing charge for
comparable service if no actual charge is paid." Id. at 804.
45. See id. at 801-02. "In U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States [citation omit-
ted] this Court held that the Harbor Maintenance Tax was unconstitutional as
applied to exports. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
1999]
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used in the HMT statute, which includes "passengers trans-
ported for compensation or hire,"46 was enough to bring the tax
within the Export Clause "even though passengers cannot be
said to be 'exported."' 47 After determining that the statute
equated passengers with export cargo, the court simply applied
its holding from United States Shoe and concluded that the
"HMT, with respect to passengers, also runs afoul of the Export
Clause of the Constitution."48
The Princess Cruises decision is well reasoned and should
stand on appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
unlikely to reverse the CIT because the reasoning is similar to
that of United States Shoe. The Supreme Court has unambigu-
ously deemed the HMT, as applied to exports, an unconstitu-
tional tax.49 Since the statute itself lists passengers as
exports,50 passengers cannot be taxed under the current case
law holding the HMT is unconstitutional as applied to exports.
This is the most logical direction for the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to follow. 51 It would otherwise have to en-
gage in linguistic torture to find that the legislature did not
mean what it expressly said in the statute-namely, that com-
mercial cargo, defined to include passengers, does not include
passengers. While in some situations it may be appropriate to
torture the statutory language to preserve the spirit of the
law,5 2 in this case even the spirit of the law is unconstitutional
Federal Circuit ("CAFC") [citations omitted], and, finally, by the United States
Supreme Court, [citations omitted]." Id.
46. 26 U.S.C. § 4462 (3)(a).
47. Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 15 F.Supp.2d 801, 804 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1998).
48. Id. at 805. Subsequently, the CIT granted the plaintiffs motion to
amend the Judgment to make a more specific order regarding the arriving pas-
senger fee - the other charge at issue in the case - and denied plaintiffs Motion
for Rehearing. See id. at 805.
49. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1296
(1998).
50. See 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)(3) (1996). Commercial cargo is defined as "any
cargo transported on a commercial vessel, including passengers transported for
compensation or hire." Id.
51. See e.g., Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 655 S.W.2d. 426 (Ark. 1983).
The Bishop Court stated that "where the meaning of an act or constitutional
amendment is clear and unambiguous," the court has no authority to construe
the act as meaning "anything other than what it says." Id. at 428.
52. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (holding
that an act prohibiting persons and corporations from assisting foreigners in
coming to the United States for employment did not cover a foreign clergyman
even though the plain language of the law appeared to cover that line of work).
The Trinity Court noted that, "it is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within
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and would not be helped by an interpretation that is contrary to
the plain meaning.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HMT AND GATT
A. ANALYSIS OF THE HMT AND THE NATIONAL TREATMENT
OBLIGATION
Since the Export Clause only prohibits the application of the
HMT to exports, its application to imports is still constitution-
ally valid. However, by removing the HMT from exports while
maintaining it on imports, the United States violates its na-
tional treatment obligation under GATT. 53 The HMT effectively
grants the advantage of tax-free port use to products originating
in the United States and denies this advantage to products from
countries other than the United States. Discrimination based
on country of origin, as the European Communities, Canada, Ja-
pan, and Norway have all recognized,5 4 is the classic national
treatment violation case.
GATT Article III, the national treatment clause, protects
like products of foreign origin from being treated less favorably
than those of domestic origin.55 It is likely that the HMT vio-
lated Article III from its enactment. The HMT applies to all
products imported into the United States via United States
ports, yet does not apply to like products produced and con-
sumed within the United States, even if the domestically pro-
duced goods are shipped via United States' waterways. This
conclusion is reinforced by the Member countries' request for
consultations to challenge the HMT even before the tax was re-
moved from exports.56
Prior to the removal from exports, the United States may
have been able to exonerate the HMT under the "user fee" excep-
tion of GATT Articles VIII and II:2(c) by arguing that the HMT
did not treat foreign imports less favorably than domestic prod-
ucts because the importers were only paying for services actu-
ally rendered. However, the GATT panel, like the Supreme
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit. " Id. at 459.
53. See Request for Consultations by the European Commission, supra
note 5; Request for Consultations by Canada, supra note 5; Request for Consul-
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Court, is unlikely to accept that argument because the HMT
bears little relation to the cost of services actually rendered. 57
Because the HMT most likely violates GATT's general obli-
gations, the United States must look to the authorized excep-
tions to GATT, Articles XX and XXI, to see if it can justify its
tax. Article XX contains general exceptions to GATT. It pro-
vides that as long as government measures do not constitute ar-
bitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade, those measures that would otherwise vi-
olate GATT are permissible if necessary to protect public
morals, 58 human, animal or plant life or health,59 or one of the
other enumerated exceptions. 60
The United States' motive in continuing to apply the HMT
against imported goods is purely economic: now that it has lost
30% of the revenue it is accustomed to receiving from the HMT
on exports, it needs the remaining 70% derived from taxing im-
porters to fund its harbor maintenance and development costs. 6 1
Unfortunately, economic strategy in isolation does not fall under
the specific exceptions of Article XX. Article XXI Security Ex-
ceptions cannot save the HMT either, since the United States
cannot argue that it is imposing an import tax in order to protect
its essential security interests. 62
Since the United States' discriminatory action against im-
ports violates the national treatment clause, is not a legitimate
user fee, and is not excusable under any of the exceptions, any
panel appointed to hear the dispute should find the United
States in violation of GATT. If the United States continues to
57. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1290, 1295
(1998). Being an ad valorem tax, the amount paid is based on the dollar value
of the cargo carried by each ship, not on the amount of services that each ship
requires.
58. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XX(a), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
59. See id. art. XX(b).
60. See id. art. XX(c)-(j) (listing the following other exceptions: relating to
importation or exportation of gold or silver; necessary to secure compliance with
other agreements, laws or regulations not inconsistent with GATT; relating to
products of prison labour; imposed to protect national treasures or exhaustible
natural resources; or necessary to ensure essential quantities of certain materi-
als for a domestic processing industry when the domestic price of material is
held below world price, or material is in short supply).
61. See Ichniowski and Rubin, supra note 6, at 12. See also Lyle Dennis-
ton, Justices Void Exports Tax for Dredging, BALTIMORE SuN, Apr. 1, 1998, at
1C (describing concern expressed by shipping interests about finding an alter-
native means for funding dredging).
62. See GATT, supra note 58, art. XXI.
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implement the HMT in spite of such a finding, the affected coun-
tries could retaliate against United States goods by imposing
higher tariffs or other trade restrictions. 63
B. ANALYSIS OF THE HMT UNDER GATT ARTICLES II AND
V1116 4
GATT Article II:1 requires Members to limit any and all tar-
iffs to those listed in the Schedules. 65 Under Article II:1, unless
the United States is charging less than its tariff binding on each
and every good imported, and the amount charged
counterbalances the imposition of the 0.125% ad valorem tax,
the United States is violating its GATT obligations. 66
Even if the HMT violates Article II:l, however, it may be
excused under the specific exceptions listed in Article 11:2. Yet,
because the HMT has been removed from domestic products des-
tined for export, the HMT would not likely be excused under Ar-
ticle II:2(a) because it is not equivalent to an internal tax on like
domestic products. The HMT similarly finds no help from the
second exception listed in Article 11:2, because the HMT was en-
acted to fund harbor maintenance and development,67 not for
any anti-dumping or countervailing duty purposes allowed by
Article VI.68
The only exception which could possibly save the HMT is
the user fee exception listed in Article II:2(c) and authorized by
Article VIII:1(a). However, when the United States used this ar-
63. GATT art. XXIII authorizes retaliation for nullification or impairment
of benefits where the contracting parties fail to negotiate a mutually satisfac-
tory solution within a reasonable time. See id. art. XXIII.
64. Because Article VIII is very similar to Article II:2(c)'s exception to the
obligations of Article II, and because the two are frequently analyzed together
by WTO Dispute Settlement Panels, this Comment will analyze them together.
65. See GATT, supra note 58, art. II, § 1.
66. "Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other con-
tracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the ap-
propriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement." Id. art.
II, § 1(a). This general requirement to limit tariffs on specific goods to a stated
maximum is further circumscribed in Article H:A(b) which states that products
of foreign origin described in the Schedule "shall, on their importation into the
territory to which the Schedule relates ... be exempt from ordinary customs
duties in excess of those set forth and provided for therein." Id. art. II, § 1(b).
67. See S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6639, 6644; H.R. Rep. No. 99-228, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
6705, 6709.
68. See GATT, supra note 58, art. II, § 2(b).
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gument in a similar WTO dispute it was unsuccessful. 69 In
1988, a WTO panel assembled at the request of Canada and the
European Economic Communities issued a report on a United
States import tax enacted in 1986 called the "merchandise
processing fee."70 This fee, like the HMT, was collected at the
port of entry and was imposed on an ad valorem basis originally
set at 0.22 percent of the value of merchandise being entered
(later reduced to 0.17 percent).71 In determining whether this
fee was indeed a "customs user fee" permissible under Article
II:2(c) or Article VIII:l(a), as the United States argued it was,
the panel applied a two part test: 1) whether the purported user
fee was a customs related user fee; and 2) whether the fee was
commensurate with the cost of services provided.
In applying the first prong of the test, the panel used the
drafting history of Articles VIII and II:2(c) to support its inter-
pretation of the provisions as pertaining only to customs-related
government services, such as "consular transactions," "statisti-
cal services," and "analysis and inspections."72 The merchan-
dise processing fee passed this prong because the revenue
received from the fee was exclusively used to fund the commer-
cial operations of the United States Customs Service and there-
fore qualified as a customs user fee.73
The panel then examined whether the fee imposed was
"commensurate with the cost of services rendered" as required
by Article II:2(c),74 or was limited "to approximate cost of serv-
ices rendered" as required by Article VIII: 1(a). 75 The panel con-
cluded that "cost of services rendered" means the actual cost of
69. See United States - Customs User Fee, Feb. 2, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D.
(35th Supp.) at 245 (1989) [hereinafter Customs User Fee].
70. Id. at 247.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 275. The Panel noted that there is a well established under-
standing of the concept of "services rendered" in Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1(a)
that the term means "government activities closely enough connected to the
processes of customs entry that they might, with no more than the customary
artistic license accorded to taxing authorities, be called a 'service' to the im-
porter in question." Id. at 276.
73. See id. at 247-48. In contrast to the HMT, whose Trust Fund provides
funding to the Army Corps of Engineers as well as the Departments of Com-
merce and the Treasury, receipts from the merchandise processing fee were de-
posited into a sub-account of the general "Customs User Fee Account" and could
only be used to by the U.S. Customs Service. See id.
74. Id. at 275.
75. Id. at 276-77.
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services provided to the importer.76 The panel therefore con-
cluded that the ad valorem method of the merchandise process-
ing fee violated GATT. 77 The panel went to great lengths to
point out that the exception granted by Article II:2(c) is an ex-
traordinary exception because it does not comport with the pol-
icy justifications of GATT (generally, to reduce all trade barriers
and restrict remaining trade barriers to negotiated tariffs set
out in the Schedules).78 Therefore, the panel concluded, "[t]he
exception stated in Article II:2(c) requires particularly strict
interpretation."79
In light of this report, it seems doubtful that the United
States would prevail were it to advance a similar argument in
the case of the HMT. First, since the HMT revenues were never
intended to relate to customs,80 the HMT would most likely fail
the first prong of the test. The HMT would also likely fail the
second prong because the amount collected under the fee has no
relation to the value of services provided. The Supreme Court's
United States Shoe decision could be adduced in support of such
an argument.8 '
76. Id. at 277. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing what
is allowable as a "service" under GATT Articles VIII and II:2(c)).
77. See Custom User Fee, supra note 69, at 279.
78. See id. at 278.
79. Id.
80. See 26 U.S.C. § 9505(c) (1996). The statute lists the types of expendi-
tures that are authorized to derive from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
as:
(1) to carry out section 210(a) of the Water Resources Development Act
of 1986 [this act provides 100% of the eligible costs to operate the Saint
Lawrence Seaway and 40% of the eligible operations and maintenance
costs necessary for commercial navigation in all harbors and inland
harbors within the U.S.] (2) for payments of rebates of tolls or charges
pursuant to section 13(b) of the Act of May 13, 1954, and (3) for the
payment of all expenses of administration incurred by the Department
of the Treasury, the Army Corp of Engineers, and the Department of
Commerce related to the administration of subchapter A of chapter 36
(relating to harbor maintenance tax), but not in excess of $5,000,000
for any fiscal year.
Id. See also H.R. 99-1013 § 210 (Oct. 17, 1986). Notably, United States Cus-
toms Service appears nowhere on the list of authorized expenditures.
'81. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1295
(1998).
1999] 337
Mi. J GLOBAL TADE
C. ANALYSIS OF THE HMT UNDER ARTICLES X AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE II:A(b)
Since the challenges to the HMT are still pending, the infor-
mation available on the complaining parties' arguments is very
sparse.8 2 Some degree of speculation is therefore required about
what aspect of the HMT they are actually challenging when an
Article under which they are challenging it contains multiple ob-
ligations. Such is the case with Article X and the Understand-
ing on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) (Understanding).
However, given what is known about the HMT, it is fairly safe to
assume that it is being challenged under Article X and the Un-
derstanding because it was not "published in such a manner as
to enable governments and traders to become acquainted" with
it83 and because it was not recorded in the United States' Sched-
ule of concessions.
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE HMT:
A VALID USER FEE
The preceding arguments have demonstrated that the HMT
is a sinking ship. Instead of waiting for it to go down, Congress
should propose a new method to generate funds for the mainte-
nance of United States ports and harbors that comports with the
Constitution and GATT. The continued need for such funds is
clear8 4 and therefore a legitimate user fee should be enacted.8 5
This fee should be carefully designed to pass the Constitutional
82. I contacted the United States Trade Representatives Office, the De-
partment of Commerce and the Delegation for the European Union, all to no
avail. No Executive Branch representatives would speak with me, claiming
they could not comment while litigation was pending. The representatives in
the Washington, D.C. Office of the Delegation for the European Communities
had no information about the arguments the Office planned to make should the
request for consultations be granted.
83. GATT, supra note 58, art. X:1.
84. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. But see Thompson, supra
note 10, at 4 (stating that most ports would take the necessary action to provide
ship channels deep enough to accommodate today's largest ships were the fed-
eral government to stop providing such services).
85. The only other alternative is for the government to impose a tax at the
manufacturing level rather than at the time of export or import. Such a tax
was upheld in Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504 (1886) (holding that the Export
Clause only prohibits taxes on goods being exported and not goods merely in-
tended for export). However, such a tax would only help replace the income lost
from the tax on exports, since the United States has no authority to tax manu-
facturing in other countries.
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and GATT user fee tests set forth in Pace and in Articles II and
VIII of GATT.
In order to pass the Pace test for exports and avoid an un-
constitutional export tax, the new fee must bear no relation to
the value of the goods shipped.8 6 Instead, the new fee must be
closely related to the amount of government services the ship
actually uses.8 7 Congress would be wise to include the factors
enumerated by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
United States Shoe and have the fee reflect "size and tonnage of
a vessel, the length of time it spends in port, and the services it
requires."88 Finally, to ensure that the new fee passes the Pace
test, it must not be excessive.8 9 The entire amount collected by
the fee must be used for its stated purpose, and the Harbor
Maintenance Trust Fund's current surplus must be spent down.
To qualify as a legitimate user fee under GATT, the new fee
must be customs related, and the amount must be commensu-
rate with the cost of the actual services rendered. In addition, it
must not result in indirect protection of domestic products or
taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes.90 That means
that the new fee should only cover the cost of actual services
each shipper uses, regardless of the products' country of origin
or destination, and should not produce any excess revenue.
Also, in order to comply with the Understanding on the Inter-
pretation of Article 11:1(b), the new user fee must be recorded in
the United States Schedule of concessions. 9'
The Clinton Administration has already drafted a plan to
replace the HMT but has not yet submitted it to Congress. 92
The new plan, the Harbor Services User Fee (HSUF),93 is
designed to conform to the Constitution and GATT, while pro-
viding funds for the maintenance of existing waterways and the
construction of additional capital improvements to the nation's
ports. 94 The fee is based on ship size and service category.95
Each ship's vessel capacity will be determined and expressed in
86. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
88. United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1295 (1998).
89. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
90. See GATT, supra note 58, art. VIII:1(a).
91. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
92. See Tim Sansbury, Clinton Harbor Fee Plan Deferred (Oct. 6, 1998) (on
file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
93. See Harbor Services User Fee and Harbor Services Fund (Aug. 24,
1998) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
94. See id. at 2.
95. See id. at 3.
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vessel capacity units (VCU).96 The Shipowner or Shipper will
then be charged a certain fee per VCU based on the ship's cate-
gory: General, Bulker, Tanker or Cruise.97 The plan states that
the categories "were chosen because there are significant differ-
ences in the level of service they require."98 Ships in the Gen-
eral category require channels to be maintained at full
dimensions and are therefore charged at the highest rate. Ships
in the other three categories require fewer harbor services, as
they sail at a less controlling depth or do not operate on strict
time schedules and thus can wait for tides or one-way traffic
scheduling. Thus, they are charged at lower rates. 9 9 The HSUF
is projected to generate approximately $1 billion per year,
slightly more than is currently collected under the HMT.10 0
Since the new fee will be based on ship size and category
rather than on the value of the goods shipped, it would easily
pass the first prong of the Pace test for legitimate user fees. 10 1
However, Pace also requires that the fee not be excessive.
10 2
The Administration will have to substantiate its choice of the
various fees charged with evidence of the actual cost of services
provided in order pass this prong of the Pace test. The Council
of European & Japanese National Shipowners' Associations
claims that the new plan is excessive because it "may dispropor-
tionately impact low value, high volume cargo, with the result
that some imports or exports may no longer be commercially via-
ble." 10 3 It thus seems likely that Congress will demand proof
that this fee is actually related to the costs of services used by
the ships before enacting the HSUF.
If the new plan passes the Pace test, it will most likely com-
ply with GATT as well. 10 4 Like Pace, Articles II:2(c) and VIII
require that the new fee be commensurate with the actual serv-





100. See id. at 2.
101. See supra note 28-30 and accompanying text
102. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
103. Counsel of European & Japanese National Shipowners' Association,
Talking Points on Proposed Harbor Services User Fee (Sept. 15, 1998) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). However, if these high volume,
low value bearing ships are indeed contributing to the wear and tear of the
ports and harbors, it is only fair that they bear some of the cost of the services
which keep the ports open for their use.
104. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
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ment that the service be related to customs. Assuming that
Congress ensures that the new fee is tied to customs by, for ex-
ample, imposing it as a license to import via U.S. harbors, the
fee should be considered a legitimate customs fee.105 GATT Ar-
ticles II:2(c) and VIII also require that the fee not result in indi-
rect protection of domestic products. Since this new fee is a user
fee and not a tax, it can be constitutionally applied to domestic,
import, and export ships, thereby eliminating any danger of in-
direct domestic protection.
The Administration's plan is an improvement over the
HMT. Congress, however, should not wait for the Administra-
tion to submit it. Rather, using the Administration's draft pro-
posal, Congress should confer with constituents who will be
affected by the plan and enact a version which complies with
both the Constitution and GATT, while providing the least
amount of interference to the shipping industry. If it does so,
Congress may even please constituents who have never heard of
the HMT, because a customs user fee can be scored as a spend-
ing cut.10 6 The Congressional Budget Office reasons that, since
the government is already providing the service, initiating a fee
decreases the cost to the government. 0 7 This scoring is only
available to fees actually linked to benefits persons receive' 08
and is therefore applicable to the proposed user fee. Congress
should take a hint from popular culture: Captain Stubing and
the original Love Boat crew have been replaced by a new and
improved version; the Harbor Maintenance Tax should be re-
placed by a new and improved fee which comports with the Con-
stitution and GATT.
105. See GATT, supra note 58, art. VIII:4(d) (listing licenses among the fees
allowable as a fee or charge in connection with importation or exportation).
106. See Administration to Score User Fees as Spending Cuts to Finance
GATT, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 8, 1994) <http://www.insidetrade.com/sec-cgi/
asweb.exe?SECIT1994+D+3494783>.
107. See id.
108. See id.
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